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Abstract 
Game theory has been used to model large-scale social events—such constitutional 
law, democratic stability, standard setting, gender roles, social movements, 
communication, markets, the selection of officials by means of elections, coalition 
formation, resource allocation, distribution of goods, and war—as the aggregate 
result of individual choices in interdependent decision-making. Game theory in this 
way assumes methodological individualism. The widespread observation that game 
theory predictions do not in general match observation has led to many attempts to 
repair game theory by creating behavioral game theory, which adds corrective terms 
to the game theoretic predictions in the hope of making predictions that better match 
observations. But for game theory to be useful in making predictions, we must be 
able to generalize from an individual’s behavior in one situation to that individual’s 
behavior in very closely similar situations. In other words, behavioral game theory 
needs individuals to be reasonably consistent in action if the theory is to have 
predictive power. We argue on the basis of experimental evidence that the 
assumption of such consistency is unwarranted.  More realistic models of individual 
agents must be developed that acknowledge the variance in behavior for a given 
individual. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Methodological individualism focuses on individual agents.  It views large-scale 
social phenomena as the result of individual mental states that lead to actions.   
Specifically, in this book, methodological individualism is defined as the view that 
all explanations within the social sciences should be centered around individuals, 
their actions, beliefs, preferences, and the like. Accordingly, social phenomena such 
as the French revolution, an increase in the crime rate, residential segregation, the 
government’s decision to lower the taxes, and the occurrence of unions are to be 
explained in terms of individuals, their actions, and the like.  
Game theory analyzes outcomes as the aggregate result of choices that 
players make during interdependent decision-making.  These choices are viewed as 
grounded in individual cognition by the players about the players involved, the 
actions they take, the information they possess, the strategies available to them, the 
outcomes they anticipate, and the equilibria that can be achieved across them.  
Game theory makes a core set of assumptions about individual agents, 
namely, that they have consistent beliefs and preferences; that their actions result 
consistently from those preferences and beliefs; that these preferences, beliefs, and 
actions remain consistent across equal choice moments; and that the basic mental 
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processes and inference procedures by which preferences and beliefs lead to actions 
remain the same under all conditions.   
It is widely established experimentally that subjects do not in general follow 
the predictions of game theory.  Accordingly, behavioral game theorists have 
stepped in with new assumptions about consistent deviations from classical 
rationality and assigned to subjects consistent dispositions to account for these 
deviations — dispositions having to do with risk preference, cognitive abilities, social 
norms, etc. All of these theories are fundamentally cognitive theories, making claims 
about how individual human minds work when choosing. 
In this article, we assess the game-theoretic modeling of individual agents. 
We argue that these game-theoretic models assume a consistency in these agents that 
is, as yet, unwarranted.  We argue that more realistic models of agents must be 
developed on the basis of systematic empirical research.   
 
2  Generalizing from experimental data 
 
The conception in game theory that consistent preferences drive decisions has had 
extraordinary influence lately.  Literature in the social sciences is replete with 
publications reporting choices by subjects engaged in economic games in laboratory 
settings.  Typically, these articles draw macroscopic inferences for real behavior from 
the behavior of these individuals in the laboratory. For example, here is the thesis of 
a highly-cited 1995 paper on general human behavior in transactions: 
We designed an experiment to study trust and reciprocity in an 
investment setting. … Observed decisions suggest that reciprocity exists as a 
basic element of human behavior and that this is accounted for in the trust 
extended to an anonymous counterpart. … Is trust a primitive in economic 
models of behavior? What factors increase (or decrease) the likelihood of trust 
in economic transactions? We provide answers to these questions in a specific 
experimental setting, the investment game. By guaranteeing complete 
anonymity and by having subjects play investment game only once, we 
eliminate mechanisms which could sustain investment without trust; these 
mechanisms include reputations from repeat interactions, contractual 
precommitments, and potential punishment threats. We then show that 
positive investments still occur, suggesting that trust is an economic 
primitive.  (Berg et al. 1995, pages 122-123.) 
The reasoning in this article—leading to the conclusion that trust is an 
economic primitive for individual agents—follows a common path: some subjects 
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play a single game in a laboratory setting; their behavior is interpreted as the reliable 
outward sign of how they think and decide; accordingly their behavior in this one 
game in an experimental setting is used as a principle for modeling them as 
individual agents tout court; and this model of individual thinking and individual 
deciding is then generalized to human cognition and behavior in the world. 
The ambition to use economic games run in laboratory settings as a 
microcosm of the world is understandable.  Science prefers when possible to reduce 
vast complexity to simpler principles, to smaller pictures congenial to human 
thought.  It would indeed be most useful if this reduction of social phenomena to a 
summation of actions by individual subjects in economic games proved to be 
scientifically legitimate.  
But we should be cautious: the history of human ideas is replete with 
reductions that have turned out to be wrong, often to the surprise of generations of 
people who relied on them.  In many cases, these misguided reductions are still 
powerfully with us.  Vedic astrology continues to exert strong influence on decision-
making among Hindus.  The Tarot deck provides a remarkable microcosm for 
understanding the future and for planning accordingly, but it has not been shown to 
have any scientific value.  Haruspication of entrails, augury, cartomancy, palmistry, 
pyromancy, and I Ching divination are similar reductions.  These reduction 
strategies are often parodied—once they are discarded by a culture—for their 
vacuity.   
In this paper, we present experimental evidence indicating that the drawing 
of macroscopic inferences about human behavior from the behavior of individuals in 
individual economic games in laboratory settings is not yet warranted.   
 
 
3  What is Going on in the Laboratory? 
Laboratories in the social sciences are unlike laboratories in the physical sciences.  
Laboratories in the physical sciences are constructed under the view that the physical 
conditions in the laboratory can be designed so as to match exactly the relevant 
conditions of interest in the world.  There is in this conception nothing, so to speak, 
about the bench scientist’s laboratory bench per se that stops the scientist from 
generalizing from what happens on the bench to the rest of reality, inclusive of those 
real situations that take place far from the scientist’s bench.  This happy conception 
of seamless generalizability allows the physical sciences, with the right care and 
nuance and adjustments, to claim that causal relationships detected in the laboratory 
for the most part generalize automatically to the world.   
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The case is utterly different for experiments on human beings, who belong to 
a social species evolved for behavior under certain conditions, and those conditions 
are not laboratory conditions.  In principle, the burden is on the experimenter to 
show that the conditions in the laboratory do indeed match the relevant conditions of 
interest in the world in all the right ways.  This can be a heavy burden, for several 
reasons.   
We must assume as a beginning point that laboratory experiments involving 
economic games should fail to generalize to the world.  The first reason we must 
make this defensive, defeasible assumption is that there are powerful and well-
known “experimenter effects.”  For a physical or chemical system, or most biological 
systems, such as algae, no one imagines that the system is thinking, consciously or 
unconsciously, about the experimental situation and the experimenters.  But human 
subjects are thinking, consciously and unconsciously, about both the experimental 
condition and the experimenters.  Accordingly, absent compelling proof to the 
contrary, although one can assume that the data from such an experiment, if the 
experiment is impeccable on all other methodological scores, reveals something 
about how the subject behaves in that experimental condition, one cannot in 
principle assume that it reveals anything about how the individuals behave outside 
of that experimental condition.   
The second reason for doubting that data from experiments involving 
economic games will generalize is that human beings and human cognition are 
evolved for messy environments.  Conditions of the laboratory are sparse—which 
means that they are not the conditions for which human beings are evolved.  The fact 
that the conditions of the laboratory are sparse requires us to be skeptical that 
generalization from experimental data to ecological human behavior is legitimate.  
Vision, for example, is evolved for conditions of white light, which are quite messy.  
Tests in the laboratory on human vision using simple, clean, monochromatic light do 
indeed show something important—namely how the human vision system operates 
under those experimental conditions—but it does not generalize to normal human 
vision.  Color constancy, for example, an indispensable feature of human vision and 
inference, does not work under monochromatic light the way it does under normal 
conditions.  An experiment under conditions that have not been demonstrated to 
match those in the real-world situations of interest is called “ecologically invalid,” or 
just “invalid.” 
In sum, methodological rigor requires that we begin from the default 
assumption (albeit a defeasible default assumption) that laboratory experiments 
involving economic games do not generalize to human behavior.  We are warranted 
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in giving up that assumption only where high covariance has been reliably 
demonstrated between the behavior in the economic game and in the normal human 
setting.  It cannot in general be assumed that inferences established from the 
microcosm of the economic games in laboratory settings generalize to the human 
macrocosm. 
 
4  Classical Economics and “Playing Nash” 
Research using economic games in experimental settings begins with the baseline 
assumption—taken from classical economics, as in (Morgenstern & von Neumann 
1947)—that subjects will optimize their payoffs within the strip of interdependent 
decision-making called the “game,” and do so by assuming that other agents will 
optimize their own payoffs.  On these assumptions, interaction in interdependent 
decision-making must follow an equilibrium path.  In this article, we will say, 
without summarizing the well-known details, that a game-player is “playing Nash” 
when she is following a rule for play (a “solution concept”) that will give her the 
optimal payoff that she can achieve through her own unilateral choices in a game 
where she is assuming both that all the other players are playing Nash and that all 
the players know each other’s equilibrium strategies.  More generally, we will say 
that the classical paradigm proposes to explain human behavior through closed-form 
analytic models as a function of the Players involved, the Actions they can take, the 
Information they possess, the Strategies available, the Payoffs for actions, the 
Outcomes for the players, and the Equilibria that can be achieved across players—
PAISPOE, for short. 
Experiments with subjects playing economic games show that in general they 
do not play Nash.   This is the oldest news on the planet, and we have nothing to add 
to that consensus, except that our batteries of experiments show the same thing.  
Details are available in (McCubbins & Turner 2012; McCubbins, Turner, & Weller 
2012a, 2012b, & 2012c). 
 
5  Epicycles 
Interpreters of data often guess why the players do not play Nash.  To have scientific 
weight, these guesses would need to survive being tested as new hypotheses against 
out-of-sample data.  Treating these guesses as knowledge would be “adding 
epicycles”—a slang term for “bad science.”  The term refers to the supposed 
penchant of Ptolemaic astronomers to preserve the underlying theory by adding 
cycles-upon-cycles-upon-cycles as needed to erase the divergence between the theory 
and the known data.  
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The need to avoid epicycles in scientific investigation is well understood.  
Gigerenzer (2004: 602) offers what he calls “Feynman’s conjecture”:   
To report a significant result and reject the null in favor of an alternative 
hypothesis is meaningless unless the alternative hypothesis has been stated 
before the data was obtained.  
 
6  “Bounded Rationality” as an epicycle 
The first and still the best-known patch for PAISPOE models is “Bounded 
Rationality,” a term coined by Herbert Simon.  According to Simon, rationality of the 
PAISPOE variety is limited because people lack information or have cognitive limits, 
including limits imposed by inability to think fast enough in the time available.  
Without a doubt, as every cognitive scientist knows, cognitive limits often make it 
impossible for people to do full PAISPOE calculation.  Also without a doubt, lack of 
information can impede PAISPOE reasoning.  Work by scholars such as Herbert 
Simon on “satisficing” and Gerd Gigerenzer on “heuristics” has contributed to our 
understanding of alternatives to PAISPOE reasoning. 
Asserting that bounded rationality accounts for the mismatch between data 
and PAISPOE models is not in principle scientifically illegitimate.  Quite the 
contrary.  But the assertion is merely an epicycle if it is presented as an explanation 
for the mismatch, in the absence of a demonstration that a particular limit is indeed 
the cause of the mismatch.   
When economists guess that subjects are failing to play Nash because 
bounded rationality impedes their ability to understand the structure of the game 
and its payoffs, the economists sometimes train the subjects on the game through 
“trial” rounds before they begin gathering the data that will be the basis of their 
conclusions.  Training utterly stops any possibility of generalizing the behavior in the 
game to ecological behavior, for two reasons: (1) training creates an absolute 
difference between crucial conditions in the experiment and the ecological situations 
in which human beings have not been trained; (2) it is well-known in cognitive 
science that human beings can be trained to a frame that is contrary to their own 
patterns, and trained to it so well that it no longer seems alien; the benefits of such 
training are widely known in the martial arts, navigation, mathematics and scientific 
reasoning, diplomacy, and so on; and there is no reason to assume that behavior 
under training to a frame will generalize to normal human behavior—indeed, the 
mismatch was the very reason for training the human being. 
Although it is indisputable that human rationality is bounded, adding 
“bounded rationality” to PAISPOE models as an epicycle has not provided us with 
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any better models of human behavior than were provided by classical economics of 
the Morgenstern & von Neumann variety.   
 
7  Framing 
Since framing can influence decision, it is often proposed that deviation from Nash is 
accounted for by framing.  The classic example of such a framing analysis is 
Kahneman and Tversky’s “Prospect Theory,” which proposes that differences in the 
framing of a choice can bias the choice one way or another despite the fact that the 
framing is immaterial to the consequences of the action with respect to the payoff 
matrix (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 & 2000).  If we frame an action as a trade, then, 
since every trade is both a loss and a gain, it is possible for us to frame the action so 
as to emphasize loss or gain.  Prospect theory proposes that there is a bias depending 
on this framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; and Tversky and Fox, 2000): it is 
assumed within expected utility theory that choosers are in general risk-averse, but, 
on the contrary, ceteris paribus, there is, according to prospect theory, a four-fold 
pattern of risk attitudes: risk-seeking for gains of low probability and for losses of 
high probability; risk-aversion for gains of high probability and for losses of low 
probability (Tversky & Fox, 2000, p. 94). Accordingly, choosers will tend to make 
different choices depending on how the choice is framed—as loss or gain—despite 
the fact that the expected values of the alternative choices are identical. Kahneman & 
Tversky focus on framing effects in the decision-theoretic problem of choosing 
between alternative lotteries.   Economists have since expanded this line of research 
into game-theoretic contexts, showing for example that framing affects the choice to 
contribute to a public good or impose externalities on others (see for example 
Andreoni, 1995; Cookson 2000).  McDermott, Fowler, & Smirnov (2008) argue that 
“context-dependent” attitudes toward risk have a basis in evolutionary psychology. 
Post, Van den Assem, Baltussen, & Thaler (2008) show this same sensitivity to 
framing in the high-stakes choices of contestants on the game show “Deal or No 
Deal,” a decision environment decidedly far-removed from the foraging of our 
evolutionary ancestors.1 
 
8  Character type 
                                   
1 Unlike experimental studies of framing, Post et al. rely on observational data, in 
which the frame (previous earnings) is not controlled by an experimenter but 
generated endogenously by the subject. 
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It is often proposed that subjects have a certain character or psychological type that 
accounts for their deviation from Nash.  For example, it is purported that people 
vary in the extent to which they are “self-regarding” versus “other-regarding.”  
Purportedly, people vary in their “risk preference.”  Purportedly, people vary in 
their tendency to forego personal gain when doing so delivers a comparably much 
larger gain for other players.  Purportedly, people vary in their preference for “fair” 
outcomes.  And so on.  It is also proposed that different players have different “level-
k” signatures in particular settings.  The idea behind “level-k” signatures is simple, 
and often used in films and novels.  Consider, for example, this passage from The 
Princess Bride: 
The Sicilian smiled and stared at the wine goblets. "Now a 
great fool," he began, "would place the poison in his own goblet, 
because he would know that only another great fool would reach first 
for what he was given. I am clearly not a great fool, so I will clearly 
not reach for your wine."  
"That's your final choice?"  
"No.  Because you knew I was not a great fool, so you would 
know that I would never fall for such a trick. You would count on it.  
So I will clearly not reach for mine either."  
"Keep going," said the man in black.  
"I intend to."  The Sicilian reflected a moment. (Goldman 1973, 
139-140.) 
The Sicilian, to make his decision, is thinking that the man in black is thinking 
that the Sicilian is thinking that the man in black is thinking that the Sicilian is 
thinking that . . . .  In theories of Level-k reasoning, we begin with Level Zero.  It is 
not clear to us from the literature what Level Zero is thought to be, but it is described 
as “unstrategic thinking,” so perhaps a Level-0 thinker (say Ann) simply shoots 
straight for the maximum payoff for herself in the payoff matrix, without any 
thought that the other player (say Paul) might have preferences of his own and so, 
strategically, interfere by making choices that move the Level-0 player, Ann, toward 
a different outcome, one that is better for Paul.  “Unstrategic thinking” might mean 
that Ann chooses as if she is playing against random, non-intentional events—
perhaps a role of the dice.  She is then playing “against nature,” in the economic 
parlance, where, oddly, “nature” does not include intentional human cognition.  Paul 
is a Level-1 thinker if he is playing so as to interact optimally with a Level-0 player.  
And so on up the line: a Level-2 thinker is imagining what a Level-1 thinker is 
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thinking and responds optimally to a Level-1 thinker’s strategy.  And a Level-3 
thinker responds optimally against a Level-2 thinker, and so on. 
The Sicilian, a self-assessed genius (“Never go in against a Sicilian when 
death is on the line!”) is many k-levels beyond everyday human subjects.  He is even 
careful to prepare against potential adaptive behavior by the man in black (e.g, the 
man in black, an unequaled fighter, might try to kill the Sicilian, who is holding a 
large knife to Buttercup’s throat to prevent this adaptive behavior): the Sicilian 
distracts the man in black, managing to get him to look away from the goblets for a 
second, during which brief interval of time the Sicilian switches the goblets.  After 
they have drunk and swallowed, the man in black announces that the Sicilian has 
guessed incorrectly.  The Sicilian crows, “You only think I guessed wrong . . . That’s 
what’s so funny.  I switched glasses when your back was turned.”  Of course, the 
Sicilian dies in the next second from the iocane powder poison: the man in black, like 
human beings everywhere, has behaved adaptively rather than strategically in the 
game.  As he explains to Buttercup, “They were both poisoned.  I’ve spent the past 
two years building up immunity to iocane powder.” 
Guesses can be hypotheses, but not explanations.  Adding terms or factors to 
a theory that has failed tests, for the sake of making the theory fit the data, is 
methodologically acceptable if these changes are regarded as new, untested 
hypotheses.    
 
9  A Battery of Experiments to Test Epicycles 
To test whether behavior in economic games can be generalized to the world at all, 
we look for the most likely candidate, that is, behavior to which the generalization is 
most likely to apply.  We take it that behavior in one economic game is most likely to 
apply to behavior   
1.   by the same subject 
2.   under identical experimental conditions  
3.   in closely similar economic games  
4.   very near in time  
Accordingly, we must put the identical subject through a continuous battery 
of such games under the identical experimental conditions.  Furthermore, in running 
this battery, we should 
1.   avoid training subjects, as discussed above, yet 
2.   test that they understand the payoff matrices and strategies of other players 
by quizzing them;  
3.   make framing as spare and general as practical; and 
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4.   hold framing as consistent as possible across this battery of measures so as 
to avoid variation in behavior owing to variation in framing. 
This is what we have done. Our battery included many economic games.   
 
10  Can we generalize from behavior in economic games? 
Subjects in our experiments are told that they are randomly paired at the beginning 
of every task with someone else in another room and that all their behavior is 
anonymous and private and that all the subjects have the same information.  They 
receive no feedback on their play or indeed any information except in the few 
interactive games that they play at the end of the battery (e.g. Trust), where they 
must be told what the other player sent.  They know that they are paid for every task 
according to how they perform, and that they will be paid at the end of the 
experiment in private by an assistant who will know only their number and the 
envelope of cash to be given to the person with that number.  The following analysis 
considers data from 190 subjects for four economic games in our battery: Trust, 
Dictator, Donation, and Majority Public Goods.  Of course, we do not use these 
misleading names in describing the experiment to subjects.  These names are only for 
ease of reference.   
Let us begin with the Trust game.  Player 1 and Player 2 both begin with $5.  
Player 1 can send any integer dollar amount to Player 2, including $0.  Whatever 
Player 1 transfers is tripled and given to Player 2.  Then Player 2 can return any 
integer dollar amount to Player 1, and the game ends.  Notice that if Player 1 sends 
anything but $0, then Player 2‘s pot of money becomes at least twice as large as 
Player 1‘s, maybe much larger. For example, if Player 1 sends $1 to Player 2, then 
Player 1 is left at that point with $4, but the $1 sent is multiplied by 3, so Player 2 has 
$8.  “Nash” for Player 1 is to send $0.  Do our 190 subjects play Nash as Player 1 in 
Trust?  Hardly.  105 of 190, or 55.3%, send money as Player 1.  This is just an example 
of the well-established fact that human subjects, informed that they are playing in an 
economic game with other human subjects, cannot be relied upon to play Nash.  It is 
this fact, as we discussed above, that induces the proposal of epicycles. 
105 subjects out of 190 received money as Player 2 in the Trust Game.  Can we 
count on them to play Nash and return $0?  No.  Given that they had every reason to 
view themselves as having been placed in an advantageous situation, can we count 
on them to be generous and not play Nash?  No.  64 of these 105 subjects, or 61%, 
play Nice and return money, and 41 of these 105 subjects, or 39%, play Nash.   
At this point, we can all feel the great temptation to “explain” these events by 
reducing the causality in the decision-making to personality: 61% of these Subjects 
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are “Nice” (or “other-regarding”) and 39% are not nice (or “self-regarding,” or 
whatever)—we call them “Nash.”   
Our central point is that such a conclusion depends upon assuming that 
human beings are consistent in their preferences and methods of making choices and 
that if they make a different choice it is because they face different conditions, yet it 
is just this assumption that most needs to be tested empirically.  
Our battery of experiments was designed so as to let us test the hypothesis 
that “personality type” generalizes, in other words, that people are consistent.  Does 
a subject’s supposed “Nice” versus “Nash” type generalize to even the identical 
subject’s behavior in identical settings and identical conditions during the same span 
of a few hours in a similar economic game?  Our battery was designed so that 
subjects played both Player 2 in the Trust and Player 1 in Dictator under the identical 
payoff conditions and, going forward, the identical game structure.  In the Dictator game, 
there are two players: the Dictator (Player 1) and the Receiver (Player 2).  The 
Dictator has an endowment and chooses what part of it, if any, to send to the 
Receiver.  The Receiver receives the amount sent and the Dictator keeps that part of 
the endowment the Dictator chose not to send, and that is the end of the game.  The 
Receiver’s role is entirely passive.  We arranged our Dictator game so that the 
Dictator has the same endowment he or she has in the role of Player 2 in Trust, and 
that the Receiver has the same endowment he or she has in the role of Player 1 in 
Trust.  These endowments are common knowledge. Accordingly, our Dictator game 
is identical to the second half of our Trust game. In effect, each individual subject 
plays the second half of the Trust game twice.  Formally, there was no mathematical 
or economic difference in any individual subject’s conditions as Player 2 in Trust and 
Player 1 in Dictator.  
Specifically, for any specific subject S*, S* was in the role of Player 2 in Trust 
at one point in the battery and Player 1 in Dictator at another point in the battery.  
We introduce the label t(S*) for the other subject with whom S* was randomly paired 
in Trust.  We introduce the label d(S*) for the other subject with whom S* was 
randomly paired in Dictator.  In Trust, where both t(S*) and S* begin with $5, t(S*) 
sends an amount (perhaps $0), which is tripled and added to the $5 endowment 
which S* had at the beginning of the game.  At that point in the Trust game, S* has a 
dollars and t(S*) has b dollars.  Later in the battery of experiments, S* plays Player 1 
in Dictator, and we arranged the experiment so that in Dictator, the endowment for 
that particular subject S* is exactly a and the endowment for specific subject d(S*) is 
exactly b.  That is, the endowments that a given subject S* faces in the two games are 
identical at these two points in the two games.  Here is a table: 
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Money that players have after the P1 send in Trust: 
   S* has a   |   t(S*) has b 
Money that players have as endowments in Dictator: 
  S* has a   |   d(S*) has b 
At this point in each of the two games, S* (for the 105 subjects who received 
money as Player 2 in Trust) has at least twice as much money as the other person.  
Accordingly, in Dictator, for these 105 subjects, a is always at least twice as large as b, 
and sometimes much bigger.   
In both games, at this point, there is only one choice left to make, and that 
choice is identical in both games: S* must choose how much, if any, of a to send to the 
subject with whom S* is randomly paired in that game.  So at this point in the two 
games, going forward, the two games have the identical structure and payoffs. 
Do the purported Nice v. Nash personality types we might think we see 
when subjects play Trust Player 2 generalize even to the identical economic situation 
with the identical choice to make, now in Dictator?   
No.  41 of the 64 Nice types as Trust Player 2 are Nice in Dictator, but 23 are 
Nash.  So the generalization works for only 64% of the Nice subjects.  37 of the 41 
subjects who are Nash during Trust Player 2 are Nash as Dictator Player 1; the 
generalization on “Nash” personality type holds (at this point) for 90% of subjects, 
making the “Nash” generalization look (at first blush) better than the “Nice” 
generalization, but still not a reliable generalization, since 10% of the Nash-types in 
Trust Player 2 are Nice as Player 1 in Dictator. 
Next, we compare the behavior of each of these subjects in Trust to the 
behavior by the same subject as Player 1 in the Donation game.  In Donation, both 
players begin with $5.  Player 1 can pass any amount of the $5 to Player 2.  The 
amount is multiplied by 4 before it is given to Player 2.  Then the game ends.  In this 
case, any amount of Niceness by Player 1 results in a fourfold level of Niceness 
received by Player 2, as measured in money.  For example, if Player 1 passes $1, 
Player 1 is left with $4, but Player 2 now has $9.  If Player 1 passes $5, Player 1 is left 
with $0, but Player 2 now has $25.  Do the Nice versus Nash personality types we 
think we might see in Trust Player 2 and Dictator generalize subject by subject to the 
Donation Game? 
No.  Of the 41 most completely confirmed Nice types in Trust and Dictator, 
27% suddenly are Nash in Donation.  That is, 41 of the 190 subjects receive money as 
Player 2 in Trust, send money as Player 2 in Trust, and send money as Player 1 in 
Dictator.  But 27% of those 41 are Nash in Donation!  Now consider the 23 Ss who 
receive money as Player 2 in Trust, play Nice as Trust Player 2, but play Nash as 
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Dictator Player 1.  What do they do in Donation?  Half (12) of those 23 play Nice and 
half (11) play Nash.  Consider the 37 subjects of 105 with the clearest Nash character 
type: they receive money as Trust Player 2 yet return nothing, and also send nothing 
as Dictator Player 1.  Can we at least count on this confirmed 35% of the pool of 105 
subjects who received money as Trust Player 2 to be rock solid Nash?  No.  In 
Donation, 30% of them play Nice.  And so on. 
Next, we compare what these specific subjects did when they played the 
Majority Public Goods game.  In this game, each subject is assigned randomly to a 
group of 10 subjects (about whom they know nothing and with whom they cannot 
communicate) and given $5.  The subjects can each keep the $5 or move the $5 to a 
group pot.  If at least 6 of the 10 do so, then the pot is tripled and each subject in the 
group receives a 10% share of the pot.  If fewer than 6 of the 10 do so, then nothing 
from the pot is given back to the subjects.  This game is not a perfect distinguisher 
between Nice and Nash, because there is one place where they overlap.  A subject 
who plays Nash will not contribute if the subject thinks that 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of 
the other players in the group will contribute.  But if the subject believes that exactly 
5 of the others will contribute to the pot, then the subject believes that joining the 
group of givers would raise its membership to exactly 6, in which case the subject 
receives $9 by contributing but $5 by not contributing.  Can we rely on the purported 
Nice types to play Nice in the Majority Public Goods game? 
No.  For example, of the 30 subjects out of 190 who receive money as Player 2 
in Trust, return money as Player 2 in Trust, send money as Player 1 in Dictator, and 
send money as Player 1 in Donation, 13, or 43%, do not contribute in the Majority 
Public Goods Game.  Similarly, of the 26 subjects who receive money as Player 2 in 
Trust, return 0 as Player 2 in Trust, send 0 as Player 1 in Dictator, and send 0 as 
Player 1 in Donation, 5, or 19%, contribute in the Majority Public Goods Game.  
Similarly, for other sub-sub-sub-subcategories of the subjects, we find that a putative 
“personality” signature is unreliable in predicting behavior in the Majority Public 
Goods Game.  
In summary, of the 105 subjects who received money as Player 2 in Trust, 
only 17, or 16%, keep a consistently “Trusting” or “Cooperative” or “Generous” 
signature, and only 21, or 20%, keep a consistently “Ungenerous” signature. 
But what about those 105 subjects who send money as Player 1 in Trust?  
Surely they were Nice.  In the Trust game, both players do much better if they trust 
each other: if Player 1 sends the full $5 available, then Player 2 has $20 and can send 
$10 back to Player 1.  Both players then have doubled their initial endowment.  
Husbands and wives in community property states, or any two people under a 
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trusted contract according to which they split the benefit, should, under Nash, 
immediately send everything as Player 1 in Trust, because the contract means that 
you do not have to rely on the generosity of the other person: you own a 50% share 
of all assets, and so does the other player.  
Let us compare behavior in the Trust Game with behavior in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game (PD).  Prisoner’s Dilemma was another part of our battery.  It is 
always set up so that a strategy of cooperating is strictly dominated by a strategy of 
defecting: Whichever choice the other player makes, the subject is always better off in 
choosing to defect.  A Nash player, of course, must defect.  Yet, if both players 
cooperate, they are better off than if both players defect.   
The data are complicated at this point by the fact that we tested four different 
kinds of framing of the identical choice and payoff structure.  The subjects did not all 
receive the same framing.  Methodologically, we might prefer then not to lump them 
together, but this raises an interesting point:  we often see in the literature data 
lumped together from different experiments with different protocols, run at different 
times by different experimenters, moreover using a between-subjects design.  In our 
case, we have a within-subjects design, in the sense that the same subjects played 
both Trust and Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Under all four Prisoner’s Dilemma framings, the 
payoffs were identical and everything else was held constant, except for the four 
framings.  In all four versions, each subject had the choice to cooperate or to defect.  
Lumping these four groups together is not methodologically clean, but it is fairly 
conservative relative to the practices we often find in the literature, and our 
overarching point here is that one should doubt generalizations assumed in the 
literature.  Can generalizations hold up over this lumping?  Here are the results. 
We start with the 105 Ss who play Nice as Player 1 in Trust.  Did they play 
Nice in Prisoner’s Dilemma?  No.  34 of 105, or 32%, play Nice.  But 68% play Nash. 
Now let us look at the other 85 subjects.  85 subjects play Nash in sending $0 
as Player 1 in Trust.  Do they play Nash in Prisoner’s Dilemma?  Not so much.  65 of 
85, or about 76%, play Nash.  But 20, or about 24% play Nice. 
 
11  Characterizations Do Not Hold Up 
Perhaps there are other ways to use economic games as laboratories in which 
behavior can be generalized to the world.  Perhaps there are other signatures, other 
reductions, in the form of characterizations.  Perhaps there are other ways in which 
economic games can serve as a microcosm from which we can learn about the 
macrocosm of human behavior.  But the ways we review here—all of which are 
forms of characterizing actors as having stable preferences and stable ways of 
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making choices—do not withstand our tests of their validity, and conclusions from 
them should be held in abeyance until science develops more realistic models of 
individual agents on the basis of systematic empirical research. 
 
12  Conclusion 
Common sense tells us that people have beliefs and desires, or beliefs and 
preferences; that they are aware of them; and that they act according to them.  But 
cognitive science has undermined commonsense notions of the mind.  What we take 
for granted about human thought has proved to be unimaginably more complex 
than anyone had expected; to be profoundly misrepresented by our supposedly 
bedrock, commonsense, intuitive notions; and to be conducted almost entirely in the 
backstage of cognition, invisible to consciousness.  The cartoons of consciousness are 
highly useful, and there is no evolutionary advantage in building consciousness so 
that it can see through them.  Human beings are awesomely effective, but for the 
most part clueless about how they work. 
The basic assumptions about the human mind made in PAISPOE models may 
seem unassailable, sheer common sense, but that cuts no scientific ice.  There status 
as common sense is no reason to accept them.  Rather, they are hypotheses, and, as 
such, must be tested to have weight.   
More than thirty years ago, Lee Ross (Ross 1977) coined the term 
“fundamental attribution error” for the excessive tendency of everyday “intuitive 
psychologists”—that is, everybody—to explain other people’s behavior by 
attributing dispositions to them.  Jocularly but also aggressively, and certainly 
influentially, he proposed that this error was the main basis for the field of social 
psychology. 
There are many assertions made in economics that depend upon the folk-
psychology assumptions we see in PAISPOE models, such as that what players are 
doing under a set of beliefs must be in equilibrium.  Where the data diverge from the 
PAISPOE models, it is tempting to deploy the fundamental attribution error to 
explain that divergence between model and data, by adding an epicycle that consists 
of characterizing the actors by attributing stable dispositions.  But perhaps the 
PAISPOE assumptions, and the assertions that depend upon them, are wrong in the 
first place.  In cognitive science, commonsense notions of how vision works, how 
language works, how memory works, how categorization works, how inference 
works, and so on have all fallen by the wayside.   
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We propose that the future of economics lies not in drawing further 
conclusions from PAISPOE assumptions but rather in testing them scientifically in 
order to recast the foundations of the field. 
If we accept the game-theoretic assumption that people have consistent 
preferences and consistent methods of deciding and that different choices are the 
result of different conditions, what are we to make of the data from our battery of 
experiments?  One hypothesis would be that we somehow fielded a group of fickle-
minded people, alien individuals, who gave us data that we must throw out as 
bizarre, or that the experiments are corrupt, or that the design involved confounds, 
and so on—and all of these possibilities should be considered. 
But there is another logical possibility that we must also consider: perhaps the 
assumption that individual agents have consistent preferences and consistent 
methods of decision-making that run across different situations and contexts is 
wrong.  After all, it is not clear on evolutionary or cognitive grounds that individual 
agents should be expected to work in this way.  There is room for doubt.  These 
assumptions of game theory may be reductions that we must discard.  Before we 
launch centuries of research on the assumption that the solar system is geocentric, we 
should collaborate to take that assumption and test it to destruction. Before we 
launch centuries of research on the assumption that individual agents are to be 
modeled as consistent modulo circumstances, we should collaborate to take that 
assumption and test it to destruction.  Our point is not at all that, with a little data, 
we prove that these assumptions are clearly wrong, but rather that we can now see 
that they are assumptions.  We cannot base science on untested assumptions.  If we 
are to build a house, we must build it on rock rather than sand, and if these 
principles are what we mean to build our house upon, we must first prove that they 
are rock and not sand.  We have not done that. 
This paper questions one prominent example of a theory committed to the 
thesis of methodological individuals, that is, game theory. We have argued that 
science needs a more adequate model of the individual actors than the one espoused 
by game theory. We need more realistic conceptions of agents—conceptions which 
must be developed on the basis of systematic empirical research. We do not suggest 
that a more adequate model of agents would automatically serve as support for the 
strong view of methodological individualism. No matter where the debates between 
methodological individualists and holists may land, there will be ample room in any 
workable social science for accounts that refer to actors. 
 
 
  
 
 17 
References 
 
Andreoni, J. 1995. Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive 
and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 110(1): 1-21. 
Berg, Joyce, Dickhaut, John, and McCabe, Kevin.  1995.  Trust, Reciprocity, and 
Social History.  Games and Economic Behavior 10: 122-142. 
Cookson, R. 2000. Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments. Experimental 
Economics 3: 55-79. 
Gigerenzer, Gerd.  2004.  Mindless Statistics.  The Journal of Socio-Economics 33: 587-
606. 
Goldman, William.  1973.  The Princess Bride, S. Morgenstern’s Classic Tale of True Love 
and High Adventure, The ‘good parts’ version, Abriged by William Goldman.  New 
York: Ballantine Books. 
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under 
risk. Econometrica 47: 263-291. 
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (eds.).  (2000).  Choices, values, and frames.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McCubbins, Mathew D. & Turner, Mark.  2012.   Going Cognitive: Tools for 
Rebuilding the Social Sciences.  In Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive 
Sciences, ed. Sun, Ron, Chapter 14, 387-414. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.   
McCubbins, Mathew D., Mark Turner and Nicholas Weller.  2012a.  The Theory of 
Minds Within the Theory of Games.  Proceedings of the 2012 International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 
McCubbins, Mathew D., Mark Turner and Nicholas Weller. 2012b. The Mythology 
of Game Theory. Proceedings of the International Conference on Social Computing, 
Behavioral-Cultural Modeling, & Prediction. Springer Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science.  
McCubbins, Mathew D., Mark Turner and Nicholas Weller. 2012c. The Challenge of 
Flexible Intelligence for Models of Human Behavior. Technical Report of the 
Association for Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Spring Symposium on Game 
Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health.   
McDermott, R., Fowler, J, H., & Smirnov, O.  2008.  On the evolutionary origin of 
prospect theory preferences. Journal of Politics 70(2): 335-350. 
Morgenstern, O. & von Neumann, J. 1947.  The theory of games and economic behavior. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
  
 
 18 
Post, T., Van den Assem, M. J., Baltussen, G. & Thaler, R. H. (2008). Deal or no deal? 
Decision making under risk in a large-payoff game show. American Economic 
Review 98(1): 38-71. 
Ross, L. 1977. The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the 
attribution process. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 10: 173-220.  
Tversky, A. & Fox, C. R.  2000.  Weighing risk and uncertainty.  In Kahneman & 
Tversky 2000, p. 93-117. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D.  1992.  Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative 
representation of uncertainty.  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5: 297-323.  
